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I. INTRODUCTION
Mass tort litigation has increased dramatically in the last twenty years.
1
This increase has placed significant burdens upon the justice system and has
led courts to seek more efficient means of adjudicating mass torts than the
traditional case-by-case method. 2 In order to avoid the repetition of
evidence that can occur if various tort claims are tried individually,
aggregative procedures and the class action device of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have recently been deemed appropriate for use in
mass tort cases. 3 Although such aggregative procedures differ from the
"classical" ADR mechanisms of arbitration and mediation, they are
nonetheless considered ADR procedures.
4
According to Rule 23(c)(4)(A), when appropriate, an action may be
brought or maintained as a class action with respect to certain particular
I See MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARD A
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATION OF AGGREGATIVE PROCEDURES 6 (1988).
2 See 3 HERBERT B. NEwBERO er AL., NEWBERO ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.01 (2d ed.
1985); ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN, MANAGING MASS TORT CASES: A RESOURCE BOOK FOR
STATETRIALCOURT JUDGES 13 (1995).
3 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783 (1990).
According to the advisory note to Rule 23, "mass accidents" are not appropriate for class
actions because of the likelihood that significant legal and factual questions would affect
individuals in different ways. Thus, some courts have denied certification of mass tort cases
under Rule 23. However, most courts today ignore the Advisory Committee's statement and
allow mass tort cases to be brought under Rule 23 (if the requirements of the Rule are met, of
course). See id.
4 See Deborah Hensler, The Use of ADR in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 8 FJC
DIRECTIONS 10 (1995). Dr. Hensler stated:
[D]espite the many possible definitions of ADR and the very imprecise way that we have
tended to use the term, I think there is a core defining principle that at least those in the
ADR movement adhere to, and that is that ADR processes ar those that permit the
parties... to gain greater control over the resolution of their disputes .... ADR seems
attractive as an approach to resolving mass torts because it promotes creative resolutions
that may recognize the complexities of the litigation and balance the interests of all those
involved in ways that simply are not possible in conventional, individualized litigation.
Id.
OHIO STATE JOUR.NAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
issues.5 The seemingly straightforward language of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) has
sparked a controversy between proponents of innovative procedures for
resolving mass tort litigation and traditionalists who seek to "stay the
course" by refusing to recognize innovative dispute resolution methods in
the mass tort arena. 6 This Note addresses that controversy as illustrated by
the In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. line of cases.7 The innovative
procedure applied by Judge John G. Grady in Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc. (hereinafter Wadleigh),8 a case based on a class action suit
involving hemophiliacs who contracted Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) as a result of alleged negligence on the part of health care providers,
will be explained. Next, the logic behind Judge Posner's opinion in In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., refusing to implement Judge Grady's procedure
and decertifying the class, will be analyzed. Finally, other examples of non-
traditional means of resolving mass tort litigation problems that have been
allowed by courts will be discussed.
In Wadleigh, Judge Grady used Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to certify the class
with respect to the negligence issue, yet not the proximate cause issue.9 If
the defendants were found to have been negligent in the original suit, each
individual plaintiff would then have had the burden of proving proximate
cause in subsequent individual suits. 10 This plan could have saved courts
time, and parties money, by precluding redundant litigation of the
negligence issue at every trial (if in fact, the defendants were found
negligent in the first place). Moreover, subsequent litigation of both the
proximate cause issue and the negligence issue would have been entirely
precluded if the defendants were not found negligent in the original trial.
The position adopted by this Note is that Judge Grady's plan should
have been given an opportunity to succeed before being rejected by the
Seventh Circuit. Innovative procedures for resolving mass tort disputes have
5 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
6 Use of Rule 23 and other aggregative procedures by judges to consolidate mass tort
litigations has been said to "represent a central goal [of the justice system] ... the resolution
of disputes." PETERSON & SELvIN, supra note 1, at 20. See also Francis E. McGovern, An
Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1821, 1822 (1995) (noting that, in the
arena of mass tort litigation, unique problems and policies have led "to more nontraditional
aggregative solutions to mass tort issues").
7 Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994), rev'd sub
nom. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 184
(1995) [hereinafter Rhone].
8 157 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
9 See id. at 423.
10 See id.
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been allowed by the Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.
11
Although all the appellate courts expressed misgivings regarding the
likelihood of success for the original procedures, only the Seventh Circuit
refused to give the trial judge's plan a chance to succeed.
I. INNOVATIVE PROCEDURE OF WADLEIGH V. RHONE-POULENC
RORER, INC.
The case that prompted Judge Grady to develop an original mass tort
resolution procedure, Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., involved
hemophiliacs who had allegedly contracted HIV as a result of tainted blood
protein concentrates provided by health care providers. 12 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants who manufactured the blood factors (these
defendants are known as fractionators) were negligent in selecting donors
and failing to use available technology to sterilize their products. 13 The
other defendant, the National Hemophilia Foundation (hereinafter
Foundation), allegedly gave the plaintiffs unfounded assurances of the
safety of the fractionators' products. 14 The plaintiffs' complaint charged the
fractionators with negligence, strict products liability, breach of implied
warranty and conspiracy; the plaintiffs' complaint charged the foundation
with negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. 15
In order to recover tort damages from any defendant, a plaintiff must
establish both negligence and proximate cause. 16 The separation of these
11 See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v.
Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist.
Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977).
12 See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 413-414. Hemophilia is a hereditary bleeding disorder
caused by an insufficiency of certain proteins in the blood which are necessary for coagulation
to occur. These proteins are called "factors," and can be removed from the blood of donors,
concentrated and infused into hemophiliacs to aid in clotting. Four defendants in this case are
manufacturers who extract these factors (specifically, Factor VIII and Factor IX) from donated
blood and distribute the finished product (called antihemophilic factor concentrate, or AHF for
short) to hemophiliacs. The other defendant is the National Hemophilia Foundation, a non-
profit association.
13 See id. at 414.
14 See Id.
15 See id.
16 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977). In Wadleigh, the
court stated, "[b]efore any member of the class would be entitled to damages, there must be
proof ofa causal relationship between the member's HIV infection and the negligence of some
defendant. Specifically, each class member must prove proximate cause." Wadleigh, 157
F.R.D. at 421.
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two concepts is the pivotal aspect of Judge Grady's plan in Wadleigh.
According to Rule 23(b)(3), questions of law or fact common to all class
members must predominate over any question affecting only individual
members in order for a class action to be certified. 17 Proximate cause was
deemed an individual issue unsuitable for class treatment because
circumstances particular to each plaintiff and varying laws of particular
jurisdictions would predominate.18 In regard to the plaintiffs' negligence
claim, however, Judge Grady held that no individual issues, originating
either from peculiar circumstances or differences in state law, predominated
over common negligence issues. 19
Judge Grady held that, unlike individual proximate cause issues, the
negligence issue could be resolved for the entire class in a single
proceeding. 20 Rule 23(b)(3) requires, in addition to a predomination of
common questions, that a class action be superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 21 Class
certification was held to be fair and economical for all parties involved, as
compared to separate individual trials in various jurisdictions where "the
same witnesses [would] monotonously repeat testimony they have given
many times before." 22 In addition to saving valuable court time by
resolving the negligence issue in a single proceeding, class certification of
the negligence issue would save individual plaintiffs the cost of hiring
expensive experts to provide their "monotonous and repetitive" testimonies,
whereas defendants could simply draft a single set of questions to be used
repeatedly at each trial. 23 However, because negligence laws are not
uniform throughout the country, the problem of variances in negligence law
had to be considered.
Judge Grady offered an innovative solution to the problem posed by the
subtle variances in negligence laws of different states. Although negligence
laws are not identical from state to state, the definition of "ordinary
17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
18 See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 422.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) is satisfied if "the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
22 Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 426.
23 See generally Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Co., 51 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 1995). Like
Wadleigh, this case involved a hemophiliac's suit against a manufacturer of blood
concentrates. Poole is cited repeatedly in Wadleigh and forms a substantial basis for that
opinion.
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negligence" does not vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.24
In addition, the defendants and Judge Grady could locate no case law
suggesting that the Restatement standard of negligence would not be
appropriate in all jurisdictions.25 However, the defendants contended that
the products and procedures observed by each defendant were different;
coupled with even subtle variances in negligence law, the defendants argued
that a single jury trial would have been impracticable. 26 In response to this
argument, Judge Grady devised a plan in which a "special verdict form"
would be drafted.
Judge Grady proposed the drafting of a special verdict form with
instructions to a jury pertaining to the ordinary or professional standard of
care in equally general terms, applicable to all jurisdictions where the
defendants' duties would be measured by such standard. 27 The special
verdict form was inspired by Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Co.,28 a case that
also involved a hemophiliac who became infected with the AIDS virus as a
24 See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 418-421. The defendants contended that negligence
laws of various states were not uniform in regard to the duty imposed upon defendants in
cases of that kind. Some jurisdictions would hold a fractionator only to the "professional
standard of care," under which the plaintiff would have to prove that the conduct of the
fractionator departed from what other fractionators were doing at that time. The professional
standard, however, has been attacked as being "senselessly indulgent ... [by making] the
medical community answerable not for want of care but for want of conformity." Id. (citing
Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmfd Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of
Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1213. Under the ordinary negligence
standard, the defendants would be held to a reasonable standard of care. The only difference
in state negligence laws that the defendants could identify was between ordinary negligence
and the legally questionable professional standard. In any event, Judge Grady concluded that
just because defendants might be subject to different duties in different jurisdictions
(professional or ordinary care), a multiplicity of individual issues is not created such that class
certification could not be granted. See id.
25 See Id. at 420.
2 6 See id. at 422.
2 7 See id. at 424.
28 51 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 1995).
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result of a tainted blood transfusion. 29 The verdict form would have been
drafted to allow a single jury to apply either the ordinary or professional
standard of negligence, take into account variations in procedure by
different defendants and record the dates on which violations, if any,
began. 30 Judge Grady concluded that proper preparation of a special verdict
form would result in the return of a single verdict that could be used for or
against the defendants in jurisdictions throughout the country. 31 For
example, if a particular defendant were found not guilty of ordinary
negligence, that defendant would be absolved of any liability to any class
members on a negligence theory. 32 However, if a defendant were found to
have been negligent, that defendant would be subject to further prosecution
by any class member who would then have the burden of proving that his
HIV infection occurred as a result of using infected concentrate distributed
by that particular defendant. 33 Defendants would either be completely
exonerated or be subjected to a subsequent trial where they could still prove
an absence of proximate cause between their product and the plaintiffs'
infection.
In sum, Judge Grady sought to provide a fair and economical solution
to one mass tort action. The special jury verdict form he suggested could
have saved valuable court time by avoiding redundant testimonies regarding
nearly identical negligence issues. In addition, individual plaintiffs could
have been saved the sometimes exorbitant fees charged by many expert
witnesses. 34 However, Judge Grady's plan was allowed neither the
opportunity to succeed nor the opportunity to fail. For reasons that will now
29 The special verdict form in Poole resembles the following diagram:
Aijpgaion Defendant
Dl D2 D3 D4 DS
Use of paid plasma donors
Failure to use surrogate testing
Failure to adopt methods to inactivate viruses
Failure to screen out previously rejected donors




34 See generally Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv.
429 (1986).
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be analyzed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decertified the class on
appeal.
Ill. INNOVATION OR USURPATION?
In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals commended Judge Grady's "innovative procedure for streamlining
the adjudication of mass torts," but nonetheless ordered decertification of
the class. 35 The Rhone court granted the extraordinary remedy of a writ of
mandamus in light of three concerns the court had with Judge Grady's
plan. 36 The Rhone court's logic in granting the writ and each of the court's
three concerns will now be discussed in turn.
A. Aggregation and Irreparable Harm Debate
Two conditions must exist for a writ of mandamus to be granted. 37
First, the challenged order must not be effectively reviewable at the end of
the case; the order must inflict irreparable harm. 38 Second, the order must
exceed the proper bounds of judicial discretion so as to be legitimately
considered usurpative in character or in violation of a clear and indisputable
legal right. 39 Therefore, irreparable injury must be coupled with a gross,
very clear or unusually serious abuse of discretion in order for mandamus to
be issued.
The Rhone court held the irreparable harm requirement to have been
met because an appeal by the defendants would come too late to provide
effective relief for those defendants. 40 If the class were not certified, the
defendants would have faced 300 lawsuits. 41 The court speculated that
because the defendants had won twelve of thirteen individual suits already
brought against them, the defendants would probably have faced liability in
35See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 184 (1995).
36 See id. at 1299.
37 Because class certification is not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, class certification is not an appealable order. However, even nonappealable orders
can be challenged by asking the court of appeals to mandamus the district court. Mandamus is
issued only in extraordinary situations because otherwise, interlocutory orders could be
termed "mandamus" rather than "appeal." See id. at 1294.
3 8 See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).
39 See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988).
4 0 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1297.
41 See id. at 1298.
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only twenty-five cases if the class was not certified.42 Conjecturing further,
the court hypothesized that class certification would involve 5,000 members
and assumed that the negligence determination (applying Judge Grady's
plan) would be decided in favor of the plaintiffs. 43 Somehow, the Rhone
court then concluded that the defendants would face $25 billion in
settlement costs if the class were certified. Because settlements are not
appealable, the defendants would be left with no remedy, and the harm to
them would be irreparable. 44 The Rhone court reached the irreparable harm
conclusion based primarily on speculation regarding the number of class
members, conjecture regarding the outcome of the initial litigation and the
assumption that settlement would occur.
According to the Rhone court's logic, the irreparable harm requirement
for granting mandamus will be satisfied by almost every class certification
order. By their very nature, class certification orders increase the likelihood
of settlement;45 this does not make the certification order any less
reviewable if defendants refuse settlement and decide to litigate to final
judgment. The fact that class certification may influence settlement does not
mean class certification inflicts irreparable harm. If the defendants litigate to
final judgment and lose, the class certification order may then be appealed.
The Rhone court makes certification orders reviewable on mandamus simply
because the likelihood of settlement makes the order unreviewable at the end
of the case.46
In her dissent to Wadleigh, Judge Rovner refuted the Rhone majority's
assumption that Judge Grady's order would prompt settlements. The class
portion of trial, she posited, would merely establish whether the defendants
were negligent in distributing tainted blood factors. 47 Each defendant would
then have ample opportunity, at subsequent individual trials, to show an
absence of proximate cause on their part.4 8 In addition, applying the
majority's logic regarding the fact that twelve of thirteen previously tried
suits held in favor of the defendants, the defendants would probably have
been confident that a jury would hold in their favor. Therefore, no reason
existed why the defendants should have been deterred from litigating the
case to its conclusion. The Rhone majority was premature in surmising that
a class verdict in favor of the plaintiffs would automatically result in
42 See id. The court further speculated that the potential damages from those
hypothetical twenty-five cases would be $125 million.
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 See In re Sugar Antitrust Litigation, 559 F.2d 481, 483-484 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977).
46 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1306 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
4 7 See Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 423.
48 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1307 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
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billions of dollars in settlement damages and cause irreparable harm to the
defendants.
B. Original Procedure Held to Exceed Judicial Discretion
The second condition required for the grant of a writ of mandamus is
that the order against which mandamus is sought must so far exceed the
bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered usurpative in
character.49 Although the Rhone court acknowledged that Judge Grady was
"responding imaginatively and in the best of faith to the challenge that mass
torts ... pose for the federal courts," the second condition for granting
mandamus was held to have been met.50 The three concerns persuading the
court to that conclusion will now be examined.
1. Aggregation and Settlement Concerns
First, the Rhone majority was concerned that even though defendants
had won 92.3% of the previous trials (twelve of thirteen suits), class
certification would force defendants to settle.5 1 The court wished to avoid
"forcing these defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a
single jury trial, or being forced... to settle .... "52 Commentators have
criticized the position adopted by opponents to aggregation and class
certification in mass tort actions as primarily anticipatory. 53 Considering the
fact that Judge Posner concedes defeat for the defendants in the original
negligence suit and also projects seven-figure settlements for each plaintiff,
his logic could undoubtedly be described as anticipatory. In addition, Judge
Posner's reasoning was attacked in In re Copley Pharmaceutical for
showing a profound mistrust in the jury system.4 Copley is similar to
Rhone in that the Copley defendant, a manufacturer of prescription
pharmaceuticals, sought decertification of a class order in a products
liability case. The Copley court found the logic in Rhone unpersuasive and
49 See Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980).




5 3 See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by
Collective Means, 62 IN. L. 561, 568 (1987).
54 161 F.R.D. 456, 460 n.4 (D. Wyo. 1995). The Copley court also pointed out that
since the defendants had been successful in twelve of thirteen previous trials, Judge Posner
should have had faith that the class jury would also be able to make a fair determination. See
Id. at 460.
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denied the decertification motion. 55 Rather than expressing a fear of
settlement based on mere prognostications, Judge Posner should have
expressed confidence that those defendants "forced to stake their companies
on the outcome of a single jury trial" would be exonerated by a fair and
impartial jury if they had committed no wrong. 56
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Arthur Young & Co. v. United States
Dist. Court57 addressed the issue of settlement in securities class action
cases. In Arthur Young, like Rhone, the defendants sought a writ of
mandamus to vacate a class certification order excluding certain issues from
the initial class trial. 58 The defendants argued that they would be faced with
accepting millions of dollars in liability by settlement if the class was
certified, an argument similar to the one Judge Posner found persuasive in
Rhone.59 However, the Ninth Circuit denied mandamus in Arthur Young,
stating that interference with the trial court's discretion "on the basis of
mere speculation by the parties or the ruling court about what may occur at
some future date" is patently unwarranted. 60 In fact, the district judge was
commended for taking a "novel and innovative" approach that could save
time and money for litigants and the courts in complex litigations. 61
The Rhone majority held that one jury cannot be trusted in a case of
this magnitude, opting instead to submit the issues to multiple juries.62 This
holding will result in many of the problems that led to the use of class
certification for mass tort actions in the first place. For example, the cost to
each plaintiff will be extremely high as compared to defendants' costs. In a
class action suit concerning antitrust law, Judge Posner's predecessors on
the Seventh Circuit stated that permitting defendants to contest liability with
each claimant in individual suits "would be almost equivalent to closing the
door of justice to all small claimants. This is what we think the class suit
practice was to prevent." 63 Mass tort claims are exceedingly, if not
prohibitively, expensive for individual plaintiffs to litigate due to complex
55 See id.
56 Denying class certification based upon fear that large businesses might be harmed by
subsequent settlement proceedings was decried by the Copley court as "economic justice."
The Copley court stated that "[sluch economic reasoning may carry substantial weight in the
Seventh Circuit, but this Court must look to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 .... Id. at 460.
57 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977).
58 See id. at 687-688.
59 See id. at 690.
60 Id. at 692.
61 Id. at 698.
62 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1300.
63 Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
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issues and the requirement of costly expert testimonies.64 Defendant firms
are able to spread litigation costs over the entire class of claims whereas
individual plaintiffs cannot.65 In addition, the interests of justice are not
furthered by needless, time-consuming repetition of evidence and repeated
litigation of common issues. 66 Relitigating the same negligence issue in
different actions before different courts unnecessarily consumes valuable
court time.67 Judge Posner's settlement logic ignores the benefits that class
certification would have served: leveling of plaintiffs' and defendants'
relative costs, avoidance of redundant relitigation of the negligence issue
and judicial economy.
2. Amalgamation of Negligence Laws Concern
The second concern expressed by Judge Posner in Rhone was the
manageability of the negligence laws of various jurisdictions. The Rhone
court pointed out that negligence laws may vary between states: "The voices
of the quasi-sovereigns that are the states of the United States sing
negligence with a different pitch." 68 In spite of these variances in
intonation, Judge Posner himself conceded that, at some level of generality,
the law of negligence is identical, not only nationwide but worldwide. 69
Although negligence laws between the states are not identical, subtle
variances in state law are not necessarily grounds for mandamus. For
example, in In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., the Second Circuit
refused to grant mandamus and decertify a class action against the chemical
companies responsible for deformities caused by Agent Orange.70 The
Diamond Shamrock court, like Judge Posner, was skeptical of attempting to
create a "national substantive rule" that might offend the Erie doctrine.71
64 See Rosenberg, supra note 53, at 563.
65 See id. at 564.
66 See NEWBERO ETAL., supra note 2, § 17.01.
67 See WRIGHT & MILER, supra note 3, § 1783.
68 Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1301.
69 See id. at 1300.
70 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1984). This case involved review of the decision In re "Agent
Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), mandamus denied sub
nom. In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1067 (1984). In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein intended to create subclasses dictated by
variations in state products liability laws. This plan is similar to Judge Grady's use of a special
verdict form to take into account variations in state negligence laws.
71 See Diamond Shamrock, 725 F.2d at 861-862 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tomkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938)). Extremely briefly, Erie stands for the proposition that "federal common
law" is not binding precedent on state courts.
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However, Judge Winter recognized that class action cases present unique
challenges to the judicial system. Thus, a unique approach, such as a single
dispositive trial on common issues, was held not to be an error properly
remediable by mandamus. 72 Judge Winter realized that review of the issues
raised by the class certification would be available when the ramifications of
the ruling were known for sure.73 Unlike Judge Posner, Judge Winter
refused to allow speculation about future trials (or settlements) to influence
his holding.
Similar to the Second Circuit in Diamond Shamrock, the Third Circuit
allowed an innovative approach to the diversity of law problem in mass tort
litigation. In In re School Asbestos Litigation, a class of school districts
sought damages from asbestos manufacturers. 74 Like Rhone, the potential
liability to the defendants in School Asbestos was immense, estimated to be
billions of dollars. 75 In order to overcome differences in products liability
laws in various jurisdictions, the types of laws were divided into categories
similar to the negligence law categories Judge Grady would have included
in his special verdict form. 76 The School Asbestos court admitted to
harboring doubts regarding the viability of the plan but refused to
"foreclose an approach that might offer some possibility of improvement
over the methods employed to date. "77 In contrast to Judge Posner's staunch
refusal to even allow Judge Grady's innovative solution to a complex
problem a chance for success, the School Asbestos court commended the
district judge for demonstrating a willingness to attempt to cope with an
unusual situation. Judge Grady's plan might have been an "improvement
over methods employed to date," but it never even had the opportunity.
Judge Grady in Wadleigh, Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange and Judge
Kelly in School Asbestos each developed innovative solutions to avoid the
waste of judicial and private resources caused by relitigation of common
issues in mass tort class action litigations. In spite of reservations held by
each circuit regarding the procedural innovations, the Ninth and Third
72 See Diamond Shamrock, 725 F.2d at 861-862. In spite of some misgivings, Judge
Winter refused to decertify the class "at least before the full results ... are known." Id. at
862. Unlike Judge Posner, Judge Winter at least gave Judge Weinstein's plan a chance to
succeed.
73 See id. at 862.
74 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
75 See id. at 1000.
76 See id. at 1010.
77 Id. at 1011. The School Asbestos court stated that "we are not inclined to reverse a
certification before the district judge has had an opportunity to put the matter to a test. We
point out the critical fact that certification is conditional. When, and if, the district court is
convinced that the litigation cannot be managed, decertification is proper." Id.
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Circuit Courts of Appeals both refused to deny the unique solutions the
opportunity to succeed. Judge Posner and the Seventh Circuit did not give
Judge Grady's plan a similar opportunity.
3. Seventh Amendment Concern
The Rhone court's third concern related to the district court's selection
of only the negligence issue for class certification. Judge Posner concluded
that the issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence were
inseparable from the defendant's negligence. Thus, the multiple juries that
Judge Grady envisioned as only deciding the proximate cause issue would
actually be reconsidering the defendants' negligence in violation of the
Seventh Amendment's double jeopardy provision. 78 Since proximate
causation is found by determining whether the harm to the plaintiff followed
in some sense naturally, without interruption and with reasonable
probability from the negligent act of the defendant, the negligence issue was
held to overlap the proximate cause issue.79 This conclusion has been
attacked by courts and commentators as contrary to Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and as
an inappropriate reason for the granting of mandamus.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion that division of the negligence and
proximate cause issues would violate the Seventh Amendment runs contrary
to the language of Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 0 In fact, the Official Comment to Rule
23(c)(4)(A) suggests a division of issues similar to that proposed by Judge
Grady:
Mhis provision recognizes that an action may be maintained as a class
action as to particular issues only... the action may retain its 'class'
character only through adjudication of liability to the class; members of
the class may thereafter be required to come individually and prove the
amounts of their respective claims. 81
The Copley court decried Judge Posner's holding as having the effect of
taking away one of the most valuable means available to courts for effective
management of mass tort litigation. 82 Commentators have pointed out that
78 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1303 (citing Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co.,
283 U.S. 494 (1931)).
79 See id.
go FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A) states, "an action may be brought or maintained as a
class action with respect to particular issues." Id.
81 In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 485, 491 n.1 (D. Wyo. 1994) (citing
Official Comment to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A)).
82 See Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 461.
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innovative solutions to the problems caused by mass tort litigation should be
given deference with respect to constitutionality because such solutions have
the potential to achieve levels of justice that would be impossible in
traditional individual trials.8 3 Rule 23(c)(4)(A) clearly provides for
separation of issues in class action litigation. Thus, any constitutional
question would have to concern the soundness of that Rule not the
application of the Rule by Judge Grady in Wadleigh.
In her dissent to the Rhone decision, Judge Rovner maintained that the
majority's constitutional concern would be better focused upon Rule 23
itself than with a proposed use of that Rule. Judge Rovner argued that Judge
Posner made a compelling case for amending Rule 23, not for avoiding
Judge Grady's original application of it.84 Moreover, if the original class
jury found the defendants were not negligent, no constitutional question
ever would have arisen. Once again, mere speculation caused Judge Posner
to eliminate a viable technique for resolution of mass tort disputes.
The proper time for review of a constitutional question regarding Judge
Grady's plan would have been after an issue of constitutionality actually
arose. As Judge Rovner pointed out, the reviewing court would then have a
record to examine instead of having to conjecture about possible future
constitutional violations. 85 In Jenkins v. Raymark Indusries, the Fifth
Circuit approved an innovative solution offered by a district judge for
resolution of a class action suit involving plaintiffs with asbestos-related
injuries.8 6 The Jenkins court acknowledged that constitutional concerns are
legitimate when dividing issues for class consideration but refused to
decertify the class before a constitutional violation came into existence.
8 7
Judge Reavley, considering the need for innovative approaches to reduce the
alarming backlog of court dockets caused by individual litigation of issues
that could be class certified, stated that "[n]ecessity moves us to change and
invent .... [S]pecific issues could be decided in a class 'mass tort' action-
even on a nationwide basis." 8 The Fifth Circuit would surely agree with
83 See Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the TDial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815, 851
(1992).
84 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1307-1308 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
85 See id. at 1307 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
86 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 785 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1986).
87 See id. at 474.
88 Id. at 473. Commentators have lauded the procedure applied by the court in Jenkins.
A Note by the Institute of Civil Justice states:
[T]he class action rapidly increased the pace of litigation. Basic discovery for all cases
was completed in one month ... [w]ithin seven months of certification of the class, the
class action disposed of almost all ... claims pending at the time of certification. This
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Judge Rovner that the mere possibility of a constitutional violation should
not result in automatic class decertification.
89
IV. CONCLUSION
Judge Posner ordered a writ of mandamus and decertified the class in
Rhone because he believed that Judge Grady's plan exceeded the bounds of
judicial discretion so far that it could be considered usurpativeY° Three
primary concerns led to this conclusion: settlement, amalgamation of
negligence law and Seventh Amendment concerns. 91 The defendants in
Arthur Young faced the possibility of millions of dollars in settlement
liability, but the Ninth Circuit refused to interfere with a "novel and
innovative" plan on the basis of mere speculation.92 The Second and Third
Circuits faced the problem of amalgamation of laws in Diamond Shamrock
and School Asbestos, respectively. In Diamond Shamrock, Judge Winter
denied mandamus because the ramifications of the certification order should
be fully ascertained before mandamus is proper. 93 Judge Kelly, in School
Asbestos, refused to deny an original plan the opportunity to improve on
methods currently employed to resolve mass tort disputes. 94 The Fifth
Circuit addressed the possibility that amalgamation could result in a
constitutional violation in Jenkins. Judge Reavley acknowledged that
constitutional concerns are legitimate when combining issues for class
certification, but mandamus is improper until such a violation actually
occurs. 95 The Second, Third, Fifth and Seventh Circuits all faced similar
issues regarding the legality of the trial judges' plans. None of the Courts of
Appeals were completely convinced that the procedures adopted by the trial
judges would succeed, but only Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit let his
misgivings take precedence over actualities.
Mass tort litigation poses daunting problems to the United States
contrasts sharply with the pace of litigation before certification of the class; some claims
within the class had been pending for up to seven years.
PETERSON & SELVIN, supra note 1, at 46.
89 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1307 n.3 (Rovner, J., dissenting). Judge Rovner's opinion was
that "the law requires that Judge Grady's plan be given the opportunity to succeed. Class
certification orders are, after all, conditional orders subject to modification or revocation as
the circumstances warrant." Id. at 1308.
90 See Rhone, 51 F.3d at 1297.
91 See Id. at 1295.
92 See discussion supra Part HI.B.1.
93 See discussion supra Part lU.B.2.
94 See Id.
95 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
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judicial system. Class certification on particular issues is allowed by Rule
23(c)(4)(A) and has been proven an effective means of reducing the backlog
of our overburdened courts. 96 Like many judges before and since, Judge
Grady was offering an innovative solution to the complex problem of mass
tort litigation. Unlike those other judges' plans, Judge Grady's plan was not
afforded a chance to help improve the resolution of mass tort disputes. As
one source noted regarding the use of original procedures in mass tort cases,
"necessity is the mother of invention. And sometimes inventions work
better than the devices they have been modeled after." 97 Judge Grady
invented a device modeled in accord with precedent and the clear language
of Rule 23(c)(4)(A), but whether or not his invention worked better than the
devices it was modeled after will never be known.
96 See Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 458 (stating "[slubsequent to class certification, this action
has moved forward with surprising speed and efficiency."). See also PETERSON & SELVIN,
supra note 1.
97 Saks & Blanck, supra note 83.
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